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Abstract
The current pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus remains transmissible among humans worldwide with cases of reverse zoonosis,
providing opportunities to produce more pathogenic variants which could pose greater human health concerns. To
investigate whether recent seasonal human or swine H1N1 vaccines could induce cross-reactive immune responses against
infection with the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus, mice, ferrets or mini-pigs were administered with various regimens (once or
twice) and antigen content (1.77, 3.5 or 7.5 mg HA) of a-Brsibane/59/07, a-CAN01/04 or RgCA/04/09xPR8 vaccine. Receipt of
a-CAN01/04 (2-doses) but not a-Brisbane/59/07 induced detectable but modest (20–40 units) cross-reactive serum antibody
against CA/04/09 by hemagglutinin inhibition (HI) assays in mice. Only double administration (7.5 mg HA) of both vaccine in
ferrets could elicit cross-reactivity (30–60 HI titers). Similar antigen content of a-CAN01/04 in mini-pigs also caused a modest
,30 HI titers (twice vaccinated). However, vaccine-induced antibody titers could not suppress active virus replication in the
lungs (mice) or virus shedding (ferrets and pigs) of immunized hosts intranasally challenged with CA/04/09. Furthermore,
neither ferrets nor swine could abrogate aerosol transmission of the virus into naı ¨ve contact animals. Altogether, these
results suggest that neither recent human nor animal H1N1 vaccine could provide complete protectivity in all animal
models. Thus, this study warrants the need for strain-specific vaccines that could yield the optimal protection desired for
humans and/or animals.
Citation: Pascua PNQ, Song M-S, Lee JH, Park KJ, Kwon H-i, et al. (2009) Evaluation of the Efficacy and Cross-Protectivity of Recent Human and Swine Vaccines
against the Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Virus Infection. PLoS ONE 4(12): e8431. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008431
Editor: Peter Sommer, Institut Pasteur Korea, Republic of Korea
Received September 23, 2009; Accepted November 26, 2009; Published December 23, 2009
Copyright:  2009 Pascua et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Funding: This research work was supported in part by a Top Brand Project grant from Korea Research Council of Fundamental Science and Technology, Korea
Research Institute of Bioscience and Biotechnology (KRIBB) Initiative Program (NTM1300811), by grant E00375 from the National Research Foundation of Korea, by
grant Z-AD14-2009-13 from the National Veterinary Research and Quarantine Service, Korea (NVRQS), Bioleaders Corp., and PWG Genetics Korea. The funders,
Bioleaders Corporation and Prestige World Genetics (PWG), Genetics Korea, had input in data collection, but had no roles in the study design, data analysis, or
preparation of the manuscript.
Competing Interests: Thomas S. Ryoo is an employee of Prestige World Genetics, Genetics Korea, Ltd., which provided the specific-pathogen-free miniature
pigs. Moon-Hee Sung is CEO of a commercial company, Bioleaders Corporation. In addition, he is a Professor at the Kookmin University in Seoul, Republico f
Korea. However, these co-authors declare that they do not have any financial, personal, or professional interests with regards to the submitted work. Thus,
authors confirm that such affiliations do not alter their adherence to all the PLoS ONE policies on sharing data and materials (as detailed online: http://www.
plosone.org/static/policies.action).
* E-mail: choiki55@chungbuk.ac.kr
Introduction
Influenza A virus is the cause of recurrent influenza epidemics
and from time to time, global pandemics. In the past century, the
world had experienced three devastating influenza pandemics
which claimed hundreds of thousands to millions of lives globally:
Spanish Flu (H1N1, 1918–1919), Asian Flu (H2N2, 1957), and
Hong Kong Flu (H3N2, 1968) [1]. A global pandemic was
declared anew last June 11, 2009 by the World Health
Organization (WHO) due to the emergence and rapid worldwide
spread of a novel influenza A (H1N1) virus, hereafter referred to as
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus [2,3]. Although majority of
laboratory-confirmed infections result in self-limiting, uncompli-
cated influenza [4,5], others require hospitalizations or have fatal
outcomes due to underlying medical conditions. Through animal
models, experts provided evidence that the virus is pathogenic in
mammalian hosts like mice, ferrets, and non-human primates [6–8]
to extent even more higher than seasonal human influenza [6].
Detailed genomic sequence analysis of the pandemic (H1N1)
2009 virus reveals that it contains unique reassortment of genes
that are of swine origin [9,10]. Consequently, pigs (both
commercial and specific-pathogen-free) are susceptible and can
transmit the virus [6,11,12]. Since its identification in April 2009,
reports of natural reverse zoonosis cases into pigs (Canada,
Australia, United Kingdom, Ireland, Norway, Japan, Iceland, and
most recently, the State of Indiana in the United States) and into
breeding turkeys (Chile and Canada) have been considerably
increasing [13]. Although the mortality rate due to infection with
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 December 2009 | Volume 4 | Issue 12 | e8431the pandemic virus among humans is low at present, establishment
of the pandemic virus in a new host may yield more virulent
strains. Pigs are strongly heralded as ‘‘mixing vessels’’ for the
exchange of genetic materials between human and animal
influenza viruses [14–17] potentially enhancing pathogenicity
and lethality of the reassortant virus.
Vaccination is the primary measure to control influenza virus
infections which come in two forms: inactivated or live-attenuated
vaccine. Annually updated influenza virus vaccines typically
contain three influenza viruses (trivalent): one A (H3N2) virus,
one A (H1N1) and one B virus as chosen by the WHO Global
Influenza Surveillance Network [18]. However, preliminary
serological analyses suggest that contemporary seasonal influenza
vaccines might not provide protective immunity to infection with
the novel virus [10,19,20,21]. Alternatively for human infections,
antiviral agents are used as chemoprophylaxis for individuals who
have not been vaccinated or for when a vaccine is not available.
Although majority of isolated pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus is
responsive to neuraminidase inhibitors and are resistant to
adamantanes, sporadic oseltamivir-resistant viruses are being
isolated worldwide [22].
In the present study, we made use of mice, mini-pigs, and ferret
animal models to assess the immunogenicity, protective efficacy,
and cross-reactivity of various regimens of vaccination with
inactivated whole-virus vaccines intended for humans (a-Bris-
bane/59/07) or for swine (a-CAN01/04). Results were compared
to data obtained with RgCA/04/09xPR8 immunization, a reverse
genetics-generated vaccine. Immunogenicity and cross-reactivity
of the vaccines were evaluated by hemeagglutination assays (HI)
while cross-protection in vaccinated animals were determined by
challenge with the A/California/04/2009 virus. We report here
and provide evidence of the inability of recent human and animal
influenza A/H1N1 vaccines to provide complete protection,
including inhibition of virus replication and transmission, among
vaccinated mammalian hosts.
Results
Immunogenicity and Protection of a 2008–2010 Seasonal
Human H1N1 Vaccine against the Pandemic (H1N1) 2009
Virus in Mice
Serum specimens collected from children and adults that were
immunized with recent seasonal influenza vaccines suggest that
receipt of such vaccines is unlikely to elicit protective antibody
immune response to the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus [19,20]. To
formally demonstrate this in our study, we determined the
immunogenicity of a seasonal human H1N1 vaccine seed virus
in the north (2008–2010) and south (2009) hemispheres in mice.
Groups of 12 mice were vaccinated once or twice with 1.77 or
3.5 mg/dose HA of a-Brisbane/59/07 or RgCA/04/09xPR8, a
reassortant vaccine virus generated by reverse genetics methods,
containing 2% aluminum hydroxide adjuvant. By comparison, A/
Brisbane/59/2007 (Brisbane/59/07) has a divergent genetic
lineage to A/California/04/2009 (CA/04/09) with 70% amino
acid identity in their HA H1 (Fig. 1). Two weeks after the last
vaccination, mice sera were collected to determine the mean
serum antibody response against Brisbane/59/07 or CA/04/09
by HI assays (Table 1). In general, mean HI titers appear to be
enhanced in a dose-dependent manner. Results indicated that
viruses homologous to the vaccine strains induced high mean HI
titers particularly at two-dose administrations of 3.5 mgH A
contents (,320 HI units). However, none of the vaccine regimens
of a-Brisbane/59/07 could elicit detectable cross-reactive immune
response beyond the limit of detection (HI titer ,20) against the
CA/04/09 virus in mice sera. Vice versa, mice receiving a booster
shot (double-dose groups) of RgCA/04/09xPR8 could only raise
modest mean antibody titers (20-40 HI units) against the human
seasonal H1N1 virus.
To investigate the protective efficacy of the vaccine, immunized
mice were intranasally (i.n.) challenged with 30ul of 10
5 50% tissue
culture infective dose per milliliter (TCID50/ml) of the wild type
CA/04/09 virus and monitored active virus replication in the
lungs. A group of mock-vaccinated mice which only received
phosphate-buffered saline (PBS) was included as control. Mice
lungs were collected at 2, 4, 6, and 8 days post infection (dpi) (3
heads per day) for virus titration in 11-day-old embryonated
chicken eggs. Experimentally challenged mice manifested clinical
signs with influenza-like disease (i.e., inactivity, ruffled and erect
hair) which was more prominent in mock-vaccinated and single-
shot groups. Mock-vaccinated mice produced high lung titers
initially detected at 2 dpi and persisting up to 8 dpi [7.0 and 4.3
log10 50% egg infectious dose (EID50) virus titers, respectively].
Compared to a-Brisbane/59/07, RgCA/04/09xPR8 demonstrat-
ed the most efficient suppression of active virus growth in mice
lungs in all of the vaccine regimens. Essentially, the pandemic
(H1N1) 2009 virus was cleared from the lungs as early as 6 dpi in
two-shot regimens with antigen containing as low as 1.77 mg/dose.
Virus clearance was delayed in single shot groups of the reverse
genetics vaccine (at 8 dpi) (Table 2). In contrast, replication of the
challenge virus in mice vaccinated with a-Brisbane/59/07 could
not completely inhibit virus replication regardless of vaccine
regimen or antigen content allowing the CA/04/09 virus to persist
up to 8 days. Lung titers were slightly reduced relative to the
mock-vaccinated group (1–2 log10 EID50 lower). However, viral
titers are still considerably higher compared to groups that
received the RgCA/04/09xPR8. These results suggest that a-
Brisbane/59/07 could not induce cross-reactive antibodies,
sufficient to provide protection against infection or abrogate
replication of the heterologous pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus in
mice lungs.
Immunogenicity and Protection of the Seasonal Human
H1N1 Vaccine in Ferrets
Ferrets are broadly accepted as suitable animal models for
influenza virus infection and transmission in humans [10,23]. To
re-affirm serologic analysis done in previous reports [19,20,21],
groups of four 15- to 16-week-old ferrets were vaccinated once or
twice with 7.5 mg/dose of HA with aluminum hyroxide adjuvant,
administered 2 weeks apart intervals for two-dose. After 2 weeks of
receiving the last vaccination, the mean HI titers against CA/04/
09 and Brisbane/59/07 were determined in ferret sera (Fig. 2).
Similar to the results obtained in mice, increased quantity and
frequency of antigen administration raised antibody titers, more
notably against the homologous H1N1 virus. In single dose
recipients, both vaccines induced detectable but modest serum
antibody titers in a homologous manner only (,20 HI units) with
no cross-reactivity. Accordingly, double-dose regimens demon-
strated marked increase of homologous virus reactivities (160 HI
titers for both vaccines) while serum cross-reactivity was minimal
(20–40 HI units) indicating poorly induced cross-immune respons-
es despite booster immunizations (Fig. 2).
To ascertain whether such minimal levels of cross-reactive
antibodies could provide any protection against infection with the
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus, ferrets vaccinated twice with
7.5 mg/doses HA of a-Brisbane/59/07 or RgCA/04/09xPR8
were subjected to virus challenge experiments. Two-dose vacci-
nated hosts received CA/04/09 virus challenge at titers 10
5
TCID50 two weeks after the last vaccination. Nasal wash
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7, and 8 dpi to examine the ability of the vaccines to hinder virus
replication in the upper respiratory tract. To monitor transmission
of the challenge virus from vaccinated to naı ¨ve animals through
the air, two seronegative ferrets were added at 1 dpi in the same
isolator constructed with perforated dividers preventing direct or
indirect contact (5 centimeter distance) but could allow virus
spread by aerosol transmission from infected ferrets. Elevated body
temperatures were noted in a-Brisbane/59/07-immunized ferrets
but not in RgCA/04/09xPR8 group from 1 to 4 dpi (39–40uC)
(Fig. 3a) with some clinical signs of illness (i.e. runny nose and
sneezing). Although the experimentally inoculated virus was
detected in both vaccine groups starting at 2 dpi, higher virus
titers were obtained from a-Brisbane/59/07-immunized ferrets
compared to recipients of RgCA/04/09xPR8 (about 2 log10
EID50 difference) indicating unhindered active replication in the
upper respiratory tract. The higher nasal titers from seasonal
human vaccine recipients were also accompanied by prolonged
virus shedding up to 5 dpi from initial virus detection and
successful virus transmission at 2 days of post contact (dpc)
(Table 3). Interestingly, aside from lowering nasal virus titers and
reduced shedding, the RgCA/04/09xPR8-vaccinated group was
also able to abrogate virus transmission to naı ¨ve contact ferrets.
Consistent with the mice immunization, it appears that the
seasonal human H1N1 could not completely protect vaccinated
hosts (allowing virus replication and transmission) against infection
with the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus.
Immunogenicity and Protectivity of a Swine H1N1
Vaccine (a-CAN01/04) in Mice and Ferrets against the
Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Virus
The current pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus had been traced to
have originated from pigs [9,10]. Therefore, we tested whether an
inactivated whole-virus swine H1N1 vaccine (a-CAN01/04,
derived from a 2004 swine virus in Korea) could afford protection
from infection among mice and ferrets. A/Swine/Korea/
CAN01/2004 (CAN01/04) and CA/04/09 are both of swine-
like origin but only share about 88% HA H1 sequence homology
(Fig. 1). Following the same experimental procedure and set-up
(vaccine regimens and HA protein content) as above, serum
antibody responses in mice sera collected 2 weeks after the last
Figure 1. Alignment of the HA1 portion of the HA molecule of H1 influenza viruses. The amino acid sequences were aligned using
Clustal_X [34,35], and the phylogenetic tree was generated by the neighbor-joining method using the tree drawing program NJ plot [36]. The scale
represents the number of substitutions per nucleotide. Branch labels record the stability of the branches over 100 bootstrap replicates. Only
bootstrap values $60% was shown in each tree. The A/California/04/2009 virus shares about 70% and 88.4% amino acid sequence homology with
the seasonal human (A/Brisbane/59/2007*) and Korean swine (A/Swine/Korea/CAN01/2004+) H1N1 viruses, respectively.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008431.g001
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serum HI antibody titers against the homologous vaccine virus
were demonstrated by mice administered with two doses of
immunization (as high as 320 HI units) (Table 1). However, when
mice sera were tested against the CA/04/09 virus, two-dose
vaccinations could only induce about 20–40 cross-reactive serum
antibodies (against heterologous virus). After determining mean
basal HI titers, mice were then experimentally inoculated i.n. with
the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus. Viral titers in mice lung
collected at 2, 4, 6, and 8 dpi indicated that a-CAN01/04 could
not inhibit viral replication. However, relatively lower lung titers
(about 1 to 2 log10 EID50 difference) were obtained compared to
the mock-vaccinated group, a pattern similarly observed in
seasonal human H1N1 vaccine recipients (Table 2).
Among a-CAN01/04 vaccinated ferrets, receipt of two doses
(containing 7.5 mg/dose of HA, adjuvanted) elicited relatively high
HI response (,60 HI units) to the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus
(Fig. 2). In contrast, homologous reactivity could be initially
detected on single dose group (HI titer 30) which was robustly
boosted in two-dose administrations (320 HI units). CA/04/09
virus challenge was also performed among two-dose vaccine
groups. Clinical signs of illness were observed in challenged ferrets,
such as inactivity and increase in body temperatures lasting for 2
days, were only noted in a-CAN01/04-vaccinated ferrets (Fig. 3a).
Nasal washes collected at indicated time points demonstrated
excretion of the challenge virus at peak titers of 4.5 log10 EID50 at
2 dpi persisting up to 5 dpi (Table 3). This substantially high and
persistent nasal virus shedding could be accounted to the aerosol
transmission of CA/04/09 into naı ¨ve animals at 2 dpc (at titers 2.5
log10 EID50).
Immunogenicity and Protectivity of a-CAN01/04 and
RgCA/04/09xPR8 in Miniature Pigs against the Pandemic
(H1N1) 2009 Virus
Pigs have demonstrated that they are susceptible to the
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus under experimental settings
[6,11,12] or through natural conditions [13]. Therefore, we also
evaluated the vaccine efficacy of the recent swine vaccine strain
(CAN01/04-like) in miniature pigs (mini-pigs). Groups of 2
specific-pathogen-free (SPF) mini-pigs were immunized once or
twice with a-CAN01/04 or RgCA/04/09xPR8 containing
7.5 mg/dose of HA protein, in a 2-week interval for two-dose
groups. Two weeks after their last vaccination, mean HI titers of
each group against CA/04/09 or CAN01/04 were determined in
swine sera. The induction of HI titers against a homologous or
heterologous H1N1 virus was elevated in a dose-dependent
manner. Single dose of a-CAN01/04 in mini-pigs elicited mean
anti-HA titer of ,30 against the CAN01/04 virus (homologous
response) but the 2 dose schedule was more effective in raising
serum antibodies (mean HI titer 240) (Fig. 4). When swine sera
were tested against CA/04/09 (heterologous response), mean HI
titers could not go beyond 40 units regardless of the regimen. In
contrast, only double-dose administration with RgCA/04/
Table 2. Virus titers in the lungs of vaccinated mice.
Vaccine regimen and HA
content Days post infection
2468
One-shot groups
1.77 mgH A
a-Brisbane/59/07 6.5 (0.3)* 5.7 (0.5) 4.5 (0.3) 3.2 (0.3)
a-CAN01/04 6.3 (0.3) 5.7 (0.5) 3.7 (0.3) 2.5 (0.5)
RgCA/04/09xPR8 5.0 (0.3) 4.1 (0.5) 2.1 (0.3) 0
3.5 mgH A
a-Brisbane/59/07 5.7 (0.5) 4.3 (0.3) 3.7 (0.3) 2 (0.2)
a-CAN01/04 5.7 (0.5) 4.3 (0.3) 2.8 (0.5) 1.5 (0.3)
RgCA/04/09xPR8 3.5 (0.3) 2.7 (0.3) 0 0
Two-shot groups
1.77 mgH A
a-Brisbane/59/07 6.0 (0.3) 4.7 (0.3) 3.3 (0.5) 2.5 (0.5)
a-CAN01/04 6.0 (0.5) 4.3 (0.3) 2.7 (0.3) 1.8 (0.3
RgCA/04/09xPR8 3.7 (0.3) 2.1 (0.3) 0 0
3.5 mgH A
a-Brisbane/59/07 5.3 (0.5) 3.7 (0.5) 2.7 (0.3) 1.5 (0.5)
a-CAN01/04 5.3 (0.3) 4.0 (0.5) 2.3 (0.3) 1 (0.5)
RgCA/04/09xPR8 2.3 (0.5) 1.2 (0.3) 0 0
Mock-vaccinated group 7.0 (0.5) 6.3 (0.5) 5.7 (0.3) 4.3 (0.3)
All vaccinated mice were intranasally (i.n.) challenged with 30 ml1 0
5 TCID50/ml
of the CA/04/09 virus 2 weeks after the last immunization. Lung tissue samples
were obtained at 2, 4, 6, and 8 days of virus challenge. Virus titers were
measured in 11-day-old embryonated chicken eggs expressed as log10 EID50/g.
The limit of virus detection was set to 0.7 log10 EID50/g.
*Standard deviation titers.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008431.t002
Table 1. Serum antibody response in mice after
administration with inactivated vaccines.
Vaccine
Vaccine
regimen Mean serum antibody titer against
HA content Brisbane/59/07 CAN01/04 CA/04/09
a-Brisbane/59/07 Single dose
1.77 mg ,10 ,10 ,10
3.5 mg2 0 – 4 0,10 ,10
Double doses
1.77 mg8 0 – 1 6 04 0,10
3.5 mg 320 80 ,10
a-CAN01/04 Single dose
1.77 mg ,10 ,10 ,10
3.5 mg ,10 30–40 ,10
Double doses
1.77 mg 40 80–160 20
3.5 mg 80 320 40
RgCA/04/09xPR8 Single dose
1.77 mg ,10 ,10 ,10
3.5 mg ,10 ,10 40
Double doses
1.77 mg2 0 2 01 6 0
3.5 mg4 0 4 0 3 2 0
Four-week-old BALB/c mice (12 heads per group) were immunized with
inactivated whole-virus a-Brisbane/59/07, a-CAN01/04 and RgCA/04/09xPR8
vaccines containing 1.77 or 3.5 mg of HA administered once or twice with
aluminum hydroxide adjuvant. Serum samples were collected 2 weeks after the
last vaccination. The limit of detection for the HI assays done was set to ,20 HI
units and HI titers are expressed as the reciprocal of the highest dilution of
serum that inhibits 8 HA units of virus (e.g., as 80 versus 1:80).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008431.t001
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CAN01/04 and CA/04/09 at mean titers 40 and 160, respectively
(Fig. 4).
Subsequent to HI titration, all two-dose vaccinated animals
received CA/04/09 virus challenge at titers 10
5 TCID50/ml two
weeks after the last vaccination. Nasal swab specimens were
collected from experimental animals on 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 dpi to
examine the ability of the vaccine to impede virus replication in
the upper respiratory tract. Except for loss of appetite, no other
remarkable sign of disease or changes in body temperature was
observed in all vaccinated swine (Fig. 3b). Both of the vaccine
groups started to shed the virus at 2 dpi but substantially higher
titers (,1 to 2 log10 EID50) were obtained from a-CAN01/04-
vacccinated animals that lasted up to 5 dpi compared to the
RgCA/04/09xPR8 group (Table 4). Transmissibility of the
challenge virus from vaccinated animals was also assessed by co-
housing the experimentally inoculated animals with seronegative
pigs a day after infection. Due to a perforated barrier, transmission
was only permitted by aerosol droplets. All naive contact pigs of
the a-CAN01/04 vaccine group were positive for virus detection
from day 3 through 5 pc indicating aerosol transmissions in mini-
pigs (at peak titers 2 log10 EID50). In contrast, RgCA/04/09xPR8-
vaccine group was able to suppress aerosol transmission of the
CA/04/09 virus, consistent to data obtained in ferrets (Table 3).
Reciprocal challenge of vaccinated hosts (done separately in
groups of mini-pigs but using the same vaccine dose and
frequency) using 10
5 TCID50/ml of CAN01/04 as the test virus
reversed the results. The a-CAN01/04 vaccine recipients blocked
the transmission of the swine H1N1 virus (CAN01/04) which the
RgCA/04/09xPR8 antigen failed to suppress (Table 4, panel 3
and 4).
To examine the pathological changes of each experimental
animal after CA/04/09 challenge experiment, lungs were
harvested (1 vaccinated and 1 contact) at 5 dpi. Gross lesions of
a-CAN01/04-vaccinated mini-pigs already indicated apparent
signs of regeneration. Both lungs are rather non-collapsed
although there were diffused consolidation of cranial lobes and
multifocal indications of bronchointerstitial pneumonia scattered
through the accessory and caudal lobes (Fig. 5a). Minimal tissue
consolidation could only be observed in the contact pig. Such
overt lung pathological features were not observed in RgCA/04/
09xCAN01/04 recipients including the naı ¨ve contact (Fig. 5b).
Overall, these data suggest that similar to the seasonal human
H1N1 vaccine, recent commercial swine H1N1 vaccine might not
also offer protectivity against infection from the pandemic (H1N1)
2009 virus. For comparison, however, the a-CAN01/04 vaccine
appears to be more immunogenic to the CA/04/09 virus than a-
Brisbane/59/07.
Discussion
Since the causative pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza virus is
considered a novel strain, it appears that currently available
human influenza virus vaccines could not elicit cross-reactive
antibodies to the current pandemic virus [19,20,21]. Although
receipt of adults with seasonal trivalent influenza vaccine generally
resulted in a small increase in antibodies against the pandemic
virus, it was not quite certain whether it is enough to provide any
Figure 2. Hemagglutinin inhibition (HI) titers in ferrets administered with inactivated vaccines (a-Brisbane/59/07, a-CAN01/04,
RgCA/04/09xPR8). Groups of four 15- to 16-week-old ferrets were vaccinated intramuscularly with one or two doses each of inactivated vaccines
containing 7.5 ml/dose of HA with 2% of aluminum hydroxide adjuvant, administered 2 weeks apart. Sera were collected from recipients after 2 weeks
the last vaccine was administered and mean hemagglutinin inhibition (HI) titers against Brisbane/59/07, CAN01/04 and CA/04/09 viruses were
determined (limit of detection: ,20 HI units) expressed as the reciprocal of the highest dilution of serum that inhibits 8 HA units of virus (e.g., as 80
versus 1:80). Data are mean 6 standard deviation titers.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008431.g002
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immunogenicity of a recent human seasonal H1N1 vaccine in
mice and ferrets and formally investigated its cross-protective
efficacy through wild-type virus challenge. On the other hand,
since the involvement of animals, particularly pigs, to the
epidemiology and spread of the virus is equally important, we
also found it urgent to determine whether an inactivated and
adjuvanted whole-virus prototype swine H1N1 vaccine would be
efficient for veterinary use. For better evaluation and comparison,
a pandemic H1N1 influenza vaccine generated by reverse genetics
was also included (RgCA/04/09xPR8).
The Brisbane/59/07 virus is one of the recommended vaccine
seed strain by the WHO against seasonal human H1N1 virus
infections in the southern (2009 influenza season) and northern
(2008–2009 and 2009–2010 seasons) hemispheres. On the other
hand, the prototype swine H1N1 vaccine (a-CAN01/04) was
prepared from a Korean swine virus isolated in 2004 [24]. The
HA1 portion of the hemagglutinin molecule of CA/04/09 only
share about 70% and 88.4% of amino acid sequence identities
with Brisbane/59/07 and CAN01/04, respectively. Such low
degree of genetic relatedness of the HA proteins could have
contributed to the poor cross-reactivity of the two vaccines against
the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus. Therefore, obtained results were
not unexpected. Only two doses of a-CAN01/04 in mice were able
to elicit detectable amount of cross-reactive antibodies (20–40 HI
titers) compared to a-Brisbane/59/07 which could not induce any
detectable HI titers beyond the detection limit regardless of the
vaccine dose or frequency of administration (Table 1). At two-dose
7.5 mg HA, swine H1N1-vaccinated ferrets also demonstrated
considerably higher cross-reactive antibody titers than seasonal
human-vaccinated groups (60 versus 30 HI titers) (Fig. 2). Results
obtained from a-Brisbane/59/07-vaccinated ferrets are consistent
to the results obtained from previous antigenic testing in ferret
post-infection antisera against currently circulating seasonal
human A/H1N1 viruses [10] or in children and adult cohort
subjects vaccinated with trivalent influenza vaccines [19,20,21].
However, intranasal virus challenge with the CA/04/09 virus in
vaccinated animals indicated that the levels of cross-reactive
antibodies detected by serologic assays were not sufficient to
completely hinder active virus replication (Table 2 and 3). All
recipients of both vaccines allowed virus persistence up to 8 dpi in
mice lungs and continuous virus shedding through the nasal route
Figure 3. Monitoring of body temperature in ferrets and mini-pigs. Mean body temperatures of ferrets (a) and mini-pigs (b) infected with
the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus (CA/04/09) or the recent Korean swine H1N1 (CAN01/04) isolate, including naı ¨ve contact animals, were monitored
daily for 11 days post infection. The range of normal body temperatures are indicated as broken lines. Standard error bars are shown.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008431.g003
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abrogate the spread of the challenge virus via aerosol transmission
into seronegative contacts. Consistently though, slightly lower
nasal viral titers (about 0.5–1 log10 EID50) were obtained in swine
H1N1-vaccinated mice and ferrets than in seasonal human H1N1-
vaccinated hosts. When the a-CAN01/04 was further tested in
mini-pigs, it can only induce limited cross-reactive immunogenic-
ity against the CA/04/09 virus (Fig. 4) which could not suppress
growth of the test virus in the upper respiratory tract and
transmission to naı ¨ve contact host through the air (Table 4). Thus,
the lack of cross-reactivity by serology could also be equated to a
lack of cross-protective immunity among vaccinated hosts in our
study. These also strongly suggest that neither the seasonal human
nor the swine H1N1 vaccine could be effectively counter infection
with the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus.
Of the three vaccines administered, it appears that only RgCA/
04/09xPR8 effectively and consistently elicited high reactive
serum antibody titers against the CA/04/09 virus in all the
immunized hosts (mice, ferrets, and pigs) (Table 1, Fig. 2, and
Fig. 3). When immunized sera were processed for micro-virus
neutralization assays using 100 TCID50 of CA/04/09 in Madin-
Darby canine kidney (MDCK) cells, administration of the reverse-
genetics vaccine demonstrated efficient virus neutralizing activity
which correlated comparably well with the vaccine-induced HI
responses (data not shown). In contrast, neutralizing activities to
the CA/04/09 virus was barely detected in either of the seasonal
Table 3. Nasal excretion of CA/04/09 in vaccinated ferrets.
Days Viral titers (log10 EID50/ml)
a-Brisbane/59/07 a-CAN01/04 RgCA/04/09xPR8
Infected Contact Infected Contact Infected Contact
21––––––
0 ––––––
2 5 (0.3)* – 4.5 (0.5) – 3 (0.5) –
4 3.5 (0.3 4 (0.5) 3 (0.3) 2.5 (0.3) 1.5 (0.3) –
5 2 (0.5) 2.5 (0.3) 1 (0.3) 1.5 (0.3) – –
6 – 1 (0.5) – 1(0.3) – –
7 ––––––
8 ––––––
Ferrets administered twice with 7.5 ml/dose HA of a-Brisbane/59/07, a-CAN01/
04 or RgCA/04/09xPR8 were experimentally instillated i.n. with 10
5 TCID50 CA/
04/09 virus challenge in a 1.0 ml volume. Aerosol transmission of the test virus
was monitored by adding seronegative contacts in an isolator with 5 cm
perforated separation barrier. Nasal wash specimens were obtained at 2, 4, 5, 6,
7, and 8 dpi. Virus titrations were done in embryonated chicken eggs (log10
EID50/ml) where the limit of virus detection was set to 0.7 log10 EID50/ml. Dash
marks indicate no virus detection.
*Standard deviation titers.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008431.t003
Figure 4. Hemagglutinin inhibition (HI) titers against the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 or Korean swine H1N1 virus in mini-pigs
vaccinated with two doses of a-CAN01/04 or RgCA/04/09xPR8. Groups of two eight-week-old specific pathogen-free mini-pigs were
vaccinated intramuscularly with one or two doses each of inactivated vaccines containing 7.5 ml/dose of HA with 2% of aluminum hydroxide
adjuvant, administered 2 weeks apart. Sera were collected from recipients after 2 weeks the last vaccine was administered and mean antibody titers
against CAN01/04 or CA/04/09 virus were determined by HI assays expressed as the reciprocal of the highest dilution of serum that inhibits 8 HA units
of virus (e.g., as 80 versus 1:80) with ,20 HI units as the limit of detection. Data are mean 6 standard deviation titers.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008431.g004
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protection. However, this result is not so surprising due to identical
antigenic match between the challenge and vaccine virus, but
rather emphasizes the need for strain-specific vaccines. Sustained
human-to-human transmission is a key requirement for pandemics
and could result in the genesis of more pathogenic variants, as
what happened with the 1918 pandemic virus (as reviewed in
Reference 25). In response to live virus challenge, this important
feature was considerably countered by the receipt of RgCA/04/
09xPR8 in ferrets and pigs: virus growth and shedding in
experimentally infected animals was limited which in turn reduced
the chance of transmission of the test virus (Table 3 and 4).
Collectively, these results indicate that the vaccine-induced
antibody response detected was able to suppress the spread of
infectious virions.
Receipt of either trivalent inactivated vaccine (TIV) or live
attenuated influenza vaccine (LAIV) is the currently acceptable
immunization strategies for the prevention and control of
influenza infection. Although both types of vaccine are effective,
the use of LAIV is considered more effective for its potential to
induce broader and more durable protection against influenza
(with regards to induction of influenza virus-specific serum and
mucosal antibodies, cytotoxic T-cell and interferon responses)
[26,27]. Due to limited and unavailable resources, we were unable
to evaluate the protective potential of seasonal influenza vaccines
in live-attenuated form such that we cannot rule out the possibility
of improved serologic cross-reactivity elicited by LAIV compared
to our inactivated preparation. Hence, it will be interesting to
investigate and compare in further studies with animal models the
efficacy of inactivated and live-attenuated vaccines to provide
protection against infection with the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus.
In summary, we report that contemporary human seasonal and
veterinary H1N1 vaccines are unlikely to induce immunologic
responses that could inhibit growth or transmission of the current
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus. Undeterred efficient dissemination
of the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus among humans could allow
opportunities to acquire adaptive mutations producing more
pathogenic variants. Alternatively, establishment in a new host
could also facilitate the production of progeny viruses with
deleterious consequences of unknown magnitude. Despite the
increasing number of countries reporting animal infections, most
notably among swine herds [13], no parallel studies evaluating the
effects of seasonal vaccination on infection with the pandemic
(H1N1) 2009 viruses in animal models (i.e., mice, pigs, ferrets)
have been reported prior to this study. Given the importance of
pigs as intermediate hosts for genetic reassortment [15] and their
proven susceptibility to this strain, it is prudent that swine
populations should also be protected to avoid their involvement in
the epidemiology of the current pandemic virus. Thus, this study
supports and warrants the development of strain-specific vaccines
that will yield the optimal protection desired for humans and/or
animals alike.
Materials and Methods
Ethics Statement
All experiments involving animal subjects were conducted in
strict accordance and adherence to relevant national and
international guidelines regarding animal handling as mandated
by the Animal Use and Care by Laboratory Animal Research
Center (LARC) in Chungbuk National University, a member of
the International Animal Care and Usage Committee (IACUC),
and in Bioleaders Corp.
Viruses
The human pandemic H1N1 virus, CA/04/09, was obtained
from St. Jude Research Hospital, USA. CAN01/04 (H1N1) is a
recent swine influenza virus strain isolated from a Korean swine
farm in 2004 [24] whose HA H1 gene is genetically related but
phylogenetically distinct from CA/04/09 (Fig. 1). The Brisbane/
59/07 vaccine seed virus was obtained from Green Cross, Korea.
Viruses were 10-fold serially diluted and the 50% tissue culture
infective doses (TCID50) were determined by infection in Madin-
Darby canine kidney cells calculated by the method of Reed and
Muench [28]. Stock viruses were kept at 280uC and thawed right
before use. All experiments were conducted under approved
biosafety level 3 (BSL-3+) facilities and conditions.
Table 4. Nasal excretion of CA/04/09 and CAN01/04 in double-vaccinated mini-pigs.
Days Viral titers (log10 EID50/ml)
CA/04/09 Challenge CAN/01/Challenge
a-CAN01/04 RgCA/04/09xPR8 a-CAN01/04 RgCA/04/09xPR8
Infected Contact Infected Contact Infected Contact Infected Contact
21 – –– –– –– –
0 – –– –– –– –
2 5 (0.3)* – 3 (0.3) – 2 (0.3) – 4 (0.5) –
4 5 (0.5) 2 (0.3) 1.5 (0.5) – 1 (0.2) – 3.5 (0.2) 3 (0.3)
5 3 (0.3) 2 (0.3) – – – – 2 (0.3) 2.5 (0.3)
6 – 1 (0.3) – – – – – 1 (0.2)
7 – –– –– –– –
8 – –– –– –– –
Two weeks after the last vaccination with a-CAN01/04 or RgCA/04/09xPR8 (7.5 mg/dose HA), 2-dose group mini-pigs received 1.0 ml 10
5 TCID50 CA/04/09 virus
challenge i.n. Nasal swabs were collected at 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 dpi. Transmission of the test virus through the air was also monitored in a similar set-up done in ferrets.
Virus titers were calculated in embryonated chicken eggs (log10 EID50/ml) and the limit of virus detection was set to 0.7 log10 EID50/ml. Dash marks indicate no virus
detection.
*Standard deviation titers.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008431.t004
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The reverse genetics RNA transcription vector, pHW2000, and
eight plasmids containing the cDNAs of influenza A/Puerto Rico/
8/34 (H1N1) (PR8) were kindly provided by Dr. Robert G.
Webster. The RgCA/04/09xPR8 reassortant virus containing the
HA and NA genes CA/04/09 in the background of PR8 was
generated by plasmid-based reverse genetics as described previously
[29]. The rescued recombinant was confirmed by re-sequencing.
The CAN01/04, Brisbane/59/07, and RgCA/04/09xPR8
viruses were propagated in the allantoic fluid of a 10-day old
embryonated chicken egg and purified by ultracentrifugation
through a 25% and 70% sucrose cushion, at 30,000 X g in 4uC
for 3 hours, as described previously [30]. Purified viruses were
inactivated by treatment with 0.025% formalin in 4uC for at least
one week which resulted in the complete loss of infectivity of the
virus. Virus inactivation was confirmed by the absence of detectable
infectious virus following inoculation of the vaccines into eggs. The
quantity of HA protein in the vaccines were determined to be 30%
of the total viral proteins by densitometric analysis of the viral
protein bands separated by sodium dodecyl sulfate-polyacrylamide
gel electrophoresis as described by Lu et al (1999) [31]. The human
seasonal and swine H1N1 vaccines used in this study were
designated as a-Brisbane/59/07 and a-CAN01/04, respectively.
Vaccination and Virus Challenge
Four-week-old BALB/c mice were obtained from Samtaco
(Seoul, Korea), eight-week-old specific-pathogen-free (SPF) outbred
miniature pigs were from PWG Genetics Korea, Ltd (Pyongtaek,
Korea), and 15- to 16-week-old ferrets were purchased from
Marshall Bio Resources (New York, USA). All animals were
seronegative for influenza A viruses by serologic assay. Mice (12
heads per group) were vaccinated intramuscularly with 1 or 2 doses
of inactivated vaccines containing 1.77 or 3.5 mg/dose of HA
containing 2% of aluminum hydroxide adjuvant in 200 ul volume,
administered 2 weeks apart. Two weeks after the last immunization,
mice were i.n. challenged with 30 ml1 0
5 TCID50 per milliliter of the
CA/04/09 virus. Mini-pigs (n=2 per group) and ferrets (n=4 per
group) were vaccinated intramuscularly with one or two doses each
of inactivated vaccines that contain 7.5 mg/dose of HA with 2% of
aluminum hydroxide adjuvant, administered 2 weeks apart.
Intranasal instillation of 10
5 TCID50 CA/04/09 virus challenge in
a 1.0 ml volume (divided between two plastic syringes for separate
inoculation of each nostril) was done after 2 weeks of receiving their
last immunization. For transmission studies in ferrets and mini-pigs,
animals (n=2) were co-housed in adjacent transmission cages fitted
in the same isolator (at a distance of 5 centimeters apart) that
prevented direct or indirect animal contact but allowed influenza
virus spread through aerosol contact from experimentally infected
animals. All viruses and animal experiments including serologic
testing were handled in a BSL 3+ containment facility approved by
the Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
Sera, Nasal Swab/Wash, and Tissue Collection
Sera from mice, mini-pigs, and ferrets were collected after 2
weeks of receiving their last vaccination, respectively, and stored at
282uC until use.
Lung tissue samples of mice were collected at 2, 4, 6, and 8 dpi
and homogenized in 1X phosphate-buffered saline (PBS) contain-
ing antibiotics. Tissue homogenates were clarified by centrifuga-
tion at 12,000 g and supernatants were transferred to new tubes.
Nasal washes (ferrets) and swabs (mini-pigs) were collected in 1X
PBS with antibiotics after days 2 to 8 of virus challenge. All
samples were immediately serially diluted 10-fold and then
inoculated into 11-day-old embryonated chicken eggs for virus
titration as computed by the Reed and Muench method with
results expressed as log10 50% egg infective dose per milliliter or
gram of tissue collected (EID50/mL or EID50/g) [28]. The limit of
virus detection was set to 0.7 log10 EID50/mL. Lungs of infected
and contact pigs (one head per group) were harvested at 5 dpi for
gross histopathological examination.
Hemagglutination-Inhibition (HI) and Virus Micro-
Neutralizing Assays
Hemagglutinin inhibition (HI) assays were done as described
elsewhere [32]. Briefly, obtained sera were treated with receptor
destroying enzyme (RDE) to inactivate non-specific inhibitors with
a final serum dilution of 1:10. RDE treated sera were serially
diluted 2-fold and equal volume of virus (8 HA units/50 ml) was
added to each well. The microplates were incubated at room
temperature for 30 min followed by the addition of 0.5% turkey
red blood cells. The plates were gently mixed and incubated at
37uC for 30 min. The HI titer was determined by the reciprocal of
the last dilution that contained turkey RBCs with no agglutination.
Figure 5. Gross pathological examination of lung tissue
samples from infected and contact mini-pigs after challenge
with the CA/04/09 virus. Lungs of 2-dose vaccinated [7.5 mgH Ao f
either a-CAN01/04 (a) or RgCA/04/09xPR8 (b)] and subsequently
challenged mini-pigs, including naı ¨ve contact hosts, were harvested
at 5 dpi to examine gross tissue morphological features after infection
with the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0008431.g005
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cells and expressed as the reciprocal of the highest dilution of
serum that gave 50% neutralization of 100 TCID50 of virus after
incubation at 37uC for 72 h [33].
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